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In this paper we will focus on collaboration in high-tech industries and more specifically on 
alliances that aim at innovation. These so called ‘technology alliances’ have typical knowledge 
and technology related issues that differentiate them from other types of alliances, such as 
collaborative distribution, production or sales agreements. This focus on technology alliances 
is relevant because recent years have shown a large increase in the use of alliances by high-
tech firms in their efforts to innovate. Alliances could be set up between actors in their 
supply chain on a dyadic level (e.g., early supplier involvement in product development 
projects), but could also encompass numerous partners including competitors (e.g., large 
research or standard setting consortia) (Hagedoorn, 1993; Gulati, 1998; Ahuja, 2000; Powell 
et al., 1996). Hence, alliances are important organizational building blocks in the 
development and evolution of supply chains and business networks.  
 
The general interest in technology alliances of both practitioners and researchers seems 
justified. Technology alliances promise fast innovation and sustained competitive advantage 
for companies in high-tech industries, where a single company rarely has the full range of 
knowledge or expertise needed for timely and cost-effective innovation (Grotenhuis & 
Weggeman, 2002). Alliances seem to have several specific advantages over more traditional 
organizational means for innovation and knowledge acquisition such as mergers and 
acquisitions, or internal R&D. But we also do know that alliances are complex and difficult 
to manage. Moreover, collaboration could lead to erosion of competitive advantage, as 
competencies, markets, knowledge and technologies are shared and dispersed among the 
partners. These advantages and disadvantages of alliances make the life of practitioners and 
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attention and a thorough assessment of trade-offs. To shed some light on these important 
issues concerning alliances, technology and innovation in high-tech industries, the following 
paragraphs will address four questions: What are ‘technology alliances’ and why do firms 
collaborate in their efforts to innovate? What are specific characteristics of technology 
alliances related to knowledge sharing and learning? Which factors influence the 
successfulness of technology alliances? And which issues are still not well understood and 
need future research attention? 
 
To answer these questions we will make use of the growing body of research literature on 
alliances and innovation. More specifically we focus on research that is concerned with 
alliance design, alliance management and performance, and knowledge sharing and 
interorganizational learning. We will not incorporate research on firm innovation and 
learning at network levels of analysis, although many interesting theories have been 
developed concerning these issues (e.g. social capital and social network theory) (Burt, 1992; 
Nahapiet & Goshal, 1998; Tsai & Goshal 1998; Gulati, 1998). For this chapter we have 
made a selection of some of the most important publications on these issues in the past ten 
years. The selection is limited to publications that have appeared in international scientific 
journals and are often cited in later publications concerning the subject. In this way we hope 
this chapter will represent the current state-of-the-art of thinking on alliances, technology 
and innovation. 
 
Technology alliances, modes and motives 
 
In this paragraph we will discuss different modes and motives of strategic technology 
alliances. As already stated, the nineties of the last century show a large increase in the use of 
inter-organizational modes of cooperation in high-tech industries (Hagedoorn, 1993; 
Hagedoorn, 2002; Powell et al., 1996). High-tech industries are characterized by a high R&D 
intensity, which means that a rather large part of firm investments are spent on research and 
development. Industries which are listed as high-tech are, for instance: biotechnology, 
microelectronics, telecommunications, new materials, aviation, defense, and medical 
instruments (Hagedoorn, 1993). In these industries collaboration on technology 
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‘strategic technology alliances’. The formal definition of a strategic technology alliance that 
we will use in this chapter is: 
 
Inter-firm cooperation for which a combined innovative activity or an exchange of 
technology is at least part of the agreement. The strategic character of the agreement 
relates to the expected long-term effects of the agreement on the product-market 
positioning of at least one of the firms (Hagedoorn, 1993). 
 
The above definition resembles the more general statements of Gulati (1998), who defines a 
strategic alliance as voluntary agreement between firms involving exchange, sharing, or 
codevelopment of products, technologies or services. Technology alliances can take a variety 
of forms and result from a wide range of (combined) motives and goals. To get a grasp of 
the definition and the large variety of forms and motives, regard the next three examples 
(based on press statements): 
 
Mobile phones & digital cameras 
“…Nokia and Kodak announced a collaboration agreement that will offer Nokia 
mobile phone users convenient solutions to store and print digital images…Nokia 
and Kodak will jointly develop kiosk printing services and other retail printing 
solutions to empower mobile users to turn their favorite pictures into prints…” 
(Nokia, 2003). 
 
Portable music & athletic experience 
“…Philips and Nike join forces to bring technology to sport and create a new 
market…the alliance will deliver innovative, technological solutions to enhance the 
athletic experience…Nike and Philips bring unique strengths to the venture. Nike 
has exceptional expertise in sports and material technology, marketing and 
innovation…Philips is a leading innovator of “wearable electronics” technologies 
and has a long heritage of technology innovation, especially in the digital arena…” 
(Royal Philips Electronics, 2002). 
  
  3Research skills & marketing power 
“…Ligand Pharmaceuticals and Eli Lilly and Company will extend … their research 
collaboration focused on discovering novel drugs for type II diabetes and 
cardiovascular disorders…Under the terms of the collaboration, Ligand receive 
research funding from Lilly. Lilly is responsible for the development and registration 
of any products resulting from the collaboration, and pays Ligand milestone 
payments – which may total more than $ 10 million per product - as products move 
through the development process. Lilly has exclusive worldwide marketing rights to 
products resulting from the research…” (Ligand Pharmaceuticals, 2003). 
 
As we can see in these three examples technology alliances often have mixed motives. Some 
relate to research or technology development and others to market access or market 
development. Hagedoorn (1993) has made an extensive overview of different motives of 
technology alliances (see table 1.). The most important motives in high-tech industries are 
(Hagedoorn, 1993; Hamel, 1991):  
 
1)  Seeking technological complementarities; because of the increased complexity and 
interdisciplinary nature of new technologies, most companies do not posses all the 
necessary competencies for innovation. Collaboration offers these companies access 
to complementary skills and technologies, and enables the partners to capitalize on 
economies of scope through joint efforts.  
2) Reduction of the innovation time span; because of fast developments in the market 
environment, rapid technological change and thus shortened product-lifecycles, it is 
increasingly important to reduce the period from invention to market introduction. 
Collaboration could help in shortening the innovation process. Sourcing technology 
or gaining access to competencies from your partner helps to reduce the time-span 
of your own innovation process. 
3) Seeking market access or influencing market structure. Through collaboration, companies 
are able to gain access to new (formerly inaccessible) markets. This is especially 
relevant if companies pursue an internationalization strategy and lack experience with 
foreign markets. Moreover, through collaboration with competitors or suppliers and 
customers, companies are able to influence the structure of the market and improve 
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firms, have become the level at which firms compete with each other (Gulati, 1998; 
Gomes-Casseres, 1994). 
Other motives which have been identified in literature and practice are summarized in table 
1. 
 
Table 1. Motives for technology alliances (as mentioned by Hagedoorn, 1993). 
Motives related to basic and applied research: 
−  Increased complexity and interdisciplinary nature of new technologies 
−  Monitoring of evolution of technologies 
−  Access to scientific knowledge or to complementary technologies 
−  Reduction, minimizing and sharing of uncertainty in R&D 
−  Reduction and sharing of costs of R&D 
Motives related to concrete innovation processes: 
−  Capturing of partner's tacit knowledge of technology 
−  Technology sharing 
−  Technological leapfrogging 
−  Reducing the period between invention and market introduction. 
Motives related to market access and search for opportunities: 
−  Monitoring of environmental changes and opportunities 
−  Internationalization, globalization and entry to foreign markets 
−  New products and markets, market entry, expansion of product range 
 
Strategic technology alliances are not only motivated differently, but also exist in very 
different inter-organizational modes of governance. These modes range from large joint 
ventures or research corporations, to minority investments, to small-scale research contracts 
and technology exchange agreements. Complex modes of governance, such as joint ventures 
and minority investments are commonly associated with alliances that have a combination of 
technology and market related motives. We will briefly elaborate on the different modes of 
governance (as mentioned by Hagedoorn, 1993; 2002): 
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Joint ventures & research corporations exist when at least two separate companies 
combine their economic interests in a ‘distinct’ firm; profits and losses are usually 
shared according to equity investment. Market and technology related motives are 
both important in most joint ventures. 
Minority equity investments are understood as cooperation, especially in the case a large 
company invests in a smaller ‘high-tech’ company, which in the long run could affect 
the technological performance of at least one ‘partner’, in particular if such minority 
sharing is coupled with research contracts.  
Joint R&D agreements are joint research pacts and joint development agreements 
which focus on joint undertaking of R&D projects with shared resources. 
Technology agreements concern technology sharing agreements and cross-licensing 
agreements. Companies both agree to partake in such an agreement and agreements 
are often exclusive. Cost economization is the main motive in this type of agreement. 
Customer-supplier relationships refer to co-production contracts, co-makership relations 
and research contracts that regulate R&D cooperation on the longer term between 
the partners.  
 
Research shows that complex modes of governance (joint ventures, minority investments) 
are for a larger part motivated by market related reasons than by technology related motives. 
Contractual arrangements are primarily motivated by technology related issues (Hagedoorn, 
1993). However, this is not prescriptive, as can be seen in the example of Philips and Nike, 
which have not structured their collaboration as a joint venture, although market and 
technology related issues are of primary concern. They have agreed on product 
development, manufacturing, and marketing contracts to enable flexibility and speed, and 
reduce the loss of investments in the case of market failure. Hence, in turbulent 
environments it could be wiser to use more flexible and simple modes of governance, 
instead of more complex modes as joint ventures. Further research is necessary to determine 
in which situation, which mode of governance is most appropriate.  
 
The next paragraph will look deeper into some characteristics of technology alliances that 
differentiate them from other types of alliances, such as sales, production or sourcing 
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during the initiation and execution of alliances. Obviously, these characteristics concern 
technology, knowledge and learning related aspects of these alliances.  
 
Knowledge sharing and learning in technology alliances 
 
Technology alliances focus on innovation and research and development. Primary objectives 
of these alliances concern the development and sharing of new technology and knowledge 
by the partners. The realized strategic value of these alliances depends partly on the 
successfulness of technology and knowledge generation within the alliance, and the 
absorption (or internalization) of new knowledge and technology by the partnering firms 
(Cohen & Levinthal, 1990). With absorption we mean that newly developed technology and 
knowledge surpasses the stage of generation, and is actually applied in new products, 
markets and business processes. Hence, to create successful technology alliances it is of great 
importance to manage knowledge and technology related processes very carefully, within 
and across the boundaries of the alliance itself. These knowledge and learning processes 
differentiate technology alliances from other types of alliances such as collaborative 
production, distribution, or marketing and sales agreements. Recent research has paid 
specific attention to these knowledge processes and dynamics in technology alliances 
(Inkpen & Dinur, 1998; Hamel, 1991; Simonin, 1999; Lane & Lubatkin, 1998; Mowery, et al., 
1996; Khanna, et al., 1998; Steensma & Corley, 2000). It is found that specific characteristics 
of knowledge and technology (and related processes) partly explain the performance of 
technology alliances. Here we will look deeper into three specific characteristics. We will 
elaborate on the nature of knowledge which influences the possibilities of sharing. We will 
examine briefly the problems of valuation  of contributed knowledge to an alliance. And, 
finally, the possible occurrence of learning races and combined competitive and cooperative 
behavior in alliances is explained. We will address these issues before we elaborate on 
alliance design and management factors that influence alliance success. We think these three 
aspects partly determine which choices practitioners have to make regarding design and 
management.  
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alliances, let us examine the Philips & Nike collaboration. One of the primary objectives of 
this alliance is to develop new ‘wearable’ electronic products for the sportive consumer, such 
as light-weight MP3-players or shock-proof disc-mans. The team of the alliance will have to 
integrate technology and knowledge from both Philips and Nike in the product development 
process. Technological knowledge about miniature electronics, materials, electronic design 
and ergonomics will have to be shared and integrated. Also, marketing know-how and facts 
about consumer preferences and performance demands will be used in the product-
development process. Next to the integration of these knowledge and technologies, Philips 
could be very interested in the marketing and branding processes and strategies of Nike. 
Nike is a world-know brand and is renowned for its state-of-the-art marketing and branding 
skills. On the market for young people (14-24 years old) Philips is confronted with strong 
competition from Sony. Sony has strong marketing and innovation skills, just like Nike. If 
Philips could learn from Nike how they succeed in their innovation and marketing effort, 
Philips could use this knowledge in other markets to compete more effectively with Sony.  
 
Tacit versus explicit knowledge 
This example shows us that not only mixed motives are discernable in this alliance, but that 
it also concerns very different types of knowledge. In the example we talked about 
technological knowledge, facts, data-sheets and designs (e.g., electronics, materials, 
ergonomics), but also about know-how, skills, and processes (e.g., miniaturization, marketing 
and branding skills, consumer responsiveness). Important difference between all these types 
of knowledge is its relative explicitness or tacitness. The distinction between tacit and explicit 
knowledge is one commonly made in research literature. Tacit knowledge refers to the 
notion that we know more than we can express (Polanyi, 1962). Tacit knowledge was 
defined by Polanyi (1962) as knowledge that is non-verbalizable, intuitive and unarticulated. 
Tacit knowledge can be best understood as knowledge that has not yet been abstracted from 
practice. Tacit knowledge is highly context specific, and has a personal quality, which makes 
it difficult to formalize and communicate (Nonaka, 1994). Tacit knowledge is associated with 
skills, competencies, attitudes and beliefs, which are embedded in social groups or 
individuals. Explicit knowledge is knowledge that is transmittable in formal, systematic 
language and may include facts, axiomatic propositions, and symbols (Zander & Kogut, 
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procedure. The distinction between tacit and explicit knowledge is important for the choices 
in design and management of the alliance. If knowledge is largely tacit it is far more difficult 
to share or exchange between partners than when it is largely explicit. The distinction 
between tacit and explicit should not be interpreted as a dichotomy, but rather as a spectrum 
ranging form explicit to tacit knowledge. Hence, knowledge can be more or less tacit or 
explicit. In the management and design of the technology alliance practitioners should take 
this distinction into account. There are different alliance design options which either 
enhance or reduce the possibilities for the sharing and exchange of tacit and explicit 
knowledge. In the next section we will elaborate on this in more detail. 
 
Knowledge valuation 
Another important aspect of knowledge and technology in alliances is the issue of 
knowledge valuation. At the initiation of the alliance and evaluation of possible partners, it is 
difficult to determine the value of the partner’s knowledge. Partners cannot show the precise 
value of their knowledge without invalidating the worth of the knowledge itself. Moreover, 
the future value of the knowledge generated during the collaboration is not known 
beforehand. Hence, negotiations about knowledge and resource contributions to the 
‘knowledge-rich’ alliance tend to be complex and rather vague. Some research suggests that 
for these alliances partners have favored non-equity forms because of their flexibility, even 
though his administrative form offers fewer protections (Osborn & Hagedoorn, 1997; 
Steensma & Corley, 2000). However, other research suggests that in general, equity-based 
alliances were a more effective means of sourcing technological capabilities from partners, 
than were contract-based alliances. This difference is attributed to the higher level of 
integration of equity-based alliances (Mowery, et al., 1996). In the next section about 
successful technology alliances we will discuss this governance issue in more detail.  
 
Learning races 
Although sharing of knowledge between partners seems an obvious thing to do to make the 
technology alliance successful, this is certainly not always the case. Partners do not always 
give the other an opportunity to learn. They often ‘hide’ proprietary knowledge or 
technology from the alliance partner, or block knowledge flows into the alliances. If 
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could reduce the opportunities for the other to learn about this knowledge. Imitation of its 
knowledge (whether it is a competency or a technology) could lead to erosion of the firm’s 
competitive advantage. So we see that, although partners are aware of the fact that alliance 
success is partly dependent on successful sharing and generation of knowledge, they also 
purposefully withhold or hide knowledge from their partners. We can explain the occurrence 
of these behaviors from a ‘learning race’ perspective (Hamel, 1991; Khanna et al., 1998). 
Hamel (1991) proposed to perceive technology alliances, in which complementarity of skills 
or technology is important, as a ‘learning race’. In a learning race partners try to outlearn the 
other partner as fast as possible. Outlearning your partner reduces the dependency on this 
partner. Central assumption in the concept of a learning race is that an alliance is still a very 
uncomfortable position for firms to be in. The only reason why you would start an alliance is 
when you don’t posses necessary skills or technologies and intent to learn (and absorb) these 
from a partner. When you have outlearned your partner and absorbed his skills and 
technologies, then you are able to terminate the alliance. As a consequence of the learning 
attempts of a partner, the other partners could decide to actively limit the opportunities for 
learning (i.e. their transparency) (Hamel, 1991). Hence, a dynamic process evolves of 
attempts to outlearn, to limit unwanted knowledge transfer, and to control necessary 
knowledge sharing to still meet alliance objectives.  
 
Khanna et al. (1998) have made one of the first attempts to explain when these learning races 
are most likely to occur in alliances. Underlying theme in their research is that firm’s 
incentives to learn are driven by their expected pay-offs, and that the structure of pay-offs 
that each partner expects is complex, interdependent and changing over time. The incentives 
to learn are high when private benefits within alliances are higher than common benefits that 
accrue to the firms in the alliance. This means that if a large part of the knowledge within the 
alliance can also be applied outside the scope of the alliance (in unrelated products and 
markets) for one of the partners, this partner is likely to have higher private benefits than 
common benefits. A higher ratio of private to common benefits leads to a stronger incentive 
to outlearn and to greater departures from cooperative toward competitive behavior. Hence, 
cooperative and competitive behaviors are both likely to occur in these technology alliances. 
Cooperation arises from the fact that each firm needs access to the other firm’s know-how, 
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them all (common benefits). While competition is a result of each firm’s attempt to also use 
its partner’s knowledge for private gains, and of the possibility that greater benefits might 
accrue to the partner that out learns the others.  
 
In this section we have mentioned three important aspects of knowledge and learning in 
technology alliances. The degree of tacitness of knowledge determines the possibilities for 
knowledge transfer and sharing. The valuation of knowledge is difficult (partly because of its 
tacit nature) which favors rather simple and flexible modes of collaboration. And, when 
private benefits are high, learning incentives will be strong, and partners will try to outlearn 
each other. Hence, both cooperative and competitive behavior will be present in 
(technology) alliances. In the next paragraph we will relate these general aspects of 
knowledge and learning to organizational variables that together influence alliance 
performance.  
 
Design and management of successful technology alliances 
 
In the previous part we addressed three specific aspects of technology and learning in 
alliances. These aspects interact with the decisions practitioners make regarding the design 
and management of technology alliances. Here we will structure some of these decisions and 
aspects from a more managerial point of view. This overview specifically focuses on 
technology and knowledge management related issues. Other relevant aspects of the design 
and management of alliances in general, will be left out of the overview. We will address 
three different categories of factors influencing alliance performance, namely: partner choice, 
governance choice and organizational design, and process management. In research literature 
these categories are commonly used to investigate alliance management and performance 
(Hamel, 1991; Inkpen, 2000; Inkpen & Dinur, 1998; Kale et al., 2000; Lane & Lubatkin, 
1998; Mowery et al., 1996, Simonin, 1999). 
 
Partner choice 
If learning from a partner or technology sharing is important, selection of a partner with 
similar knowledge and organizational characteristics positively influences alliance 
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common understanding and knowledge sharing (Lane & Lubatkin, 1998; Mowery, et al., 
1996). Of course, collaboration is often motivated by seeking complementarities and not 
similarities, but some overlap in basic knowledge is necessary to enable effective knowledge 
sharing (e.g., basic biochemistry knowledge in biotech – pharmaceutical alliances). Next to 
this, it is found that similarity of the firm’s dominant logic and organizational problem set 
enhances alliance performance (Lane & Lubatkin, 1998). If a partner is familiar with the 
other partner’s set of organizational problems (i.e.  products and markets) it is able to 
understand better why specific knowledge and technology are important to develop and 
apply. Knowledge and technology are more easily absorbed by the partners if these partners 
apply it in similar problem situations. The final partner characteristics we would like to 
mention is the partner’s collaborative know-how or prior alliance experience. When a firm 
has prior experience with alliances in general or with the same partner in particular this 
greatly enhances the performance of the alliance (Simonin 1999; Kale et al., 2000). Of course, 
a firm cannot “choose” its own level of collaborative know-how and experience, it has to 
develop this by learning-by-doing, but it can select a partner which does have alliance 
experience. Hence, alliance experience is an important selection criterion.  
 
Governance choice and organizational design 
The choice of the mode of governance has important implications for the performance of 
the alliance when we look at knowledge transfer and technology development. Steensma and 
Corley (2000) have examined the interaction between mode of governance and attributes of 
technology (i.e., its uniqueness, imitability and dynamism). They suggest that difficult to 
imitate technology and tacit knowledge favor tight coupling governance structures such as 
joint ventures and acquisitions. A more tightly coupled collaboration (equity investments, 
strong alignment of objectives, and frequent interaction between partners) enhances the 
opportunity to learn and share more difficult to imitate technologies and knowledge. 
Mowery et al. (1996) also show that interfirm transfer of technology is more enhanced in 
equity joint ventures, than in contract-based alliances. However, if the technology’s 
dynamism is high, more loosely coupled governance structures are favored (Steensma & 
Corley, 2000). Thus, when the length of the technology lifecycle is rather short and the 
likelihood of future competence-destroying developments is high (in a turbulent 
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necessary flexibility.  
 
Closely related to the choice of the legal and financial structure of the alliance is the 
organizational design of the alliance. Organizational design concerns the structure of tasks, 
interfaces and resource allocation of the alliance. When technology and knowledge are 
difficult to imitate or highly tacit, close cooperation enhances the opportunities to learn 
(Hamel, 1991; Simonin, 1999; Inkpen & Dinur, 1998). This means that the execution of 
multiple joint tasks and the existence of multiple linkages between personnel at several 
hierarchical levels of the partnering firms, positively influence the transfer of technology and 
knowledge. Proper resource allocation to the alliance also enhances alliance performance. 
This is not only a matter of financial resource allocation; in the case of knowledge sharing 
and technology development this specifically concerns the allocation of qualified human 
resources and expertise. Especially when knowledge is complex and tacit, the allocation of 
experienced personnel to the alliance and the set up of cross-organizational and cross-
functional alliance teams greatly improves alliance performance. Personnel should have 
experience with the technology and knowledge, but should also have experience with 
alliances and the partner (Hamel, 1991; Simonin, 1999).  
 
Process management 
As argued in the former paragraph (technology) alliances show complex process dynamics. 
Managing the occurrence of combined competitive and cooperative behavior (learning races) 
is a challenge to most alliance managers. Partners are trying to learn and are also trying to 
protect. If a firm contributes too little to building the relationship, the alliance may be 
doomed to fail; on the other hand, if it contributes too much and too openly, its partner will 
gain the upper hand (Kale et al., 2000). A proper governance structure will help to solve 
possible conflicts about knowledge sharing and knowledge protection. However, not all 
possible conflicts and issues can be predicted up front and hence, a priori defined contracts 
and regulations have their limits. For practitioners it is thus important to develop capabilities 
and instruments to manage the alliance when it is running. Relational capital and integrative 
conflict management are both such capabilities which can be developed and applied to 
enhance alliance success. Relational capital refers to mutual trust, respect and friendship at 
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personal level (Kale et al., 2000). Integrative conflict management entails joint management 
of conflict with mutual concern for ‘win-win’ situations for all concerned. It is a 
communicative and contact-intensive process with honest and open lines of communication. 
Organized monitoring of concerns and conflicts leads to higher levels of procedural justice 
and trust (Kale et al., 2000). Research has shown that the greater the relational capital that 
exists between partners, the greater will be the degree of learning achieved. This also applies 
for integrative conflict management. Moreover, the greater the extents to which conflicts are 
managed in an integrated way, the greater will be the partner’s ability to protect core assets 
from each other. Kale et al., (2000) show that the development of relational capital and 
application of integrative conflict management offer the possibility to learn and protect 
concurrently. These process instruments are just as important as the choice of the proper 
governance structure (equity vs. non-equity) or organizational fit (complementarities and 
compatibility) of both partners. We have summarized all factors influencing technology 
alliance performance in table 2.  We acknowledge that this overview is not exhaustive, but 
only indicative. We have limited ourselves to knowledge and technology related factors and 
interactions which we have mentioned in this section.  
 
Table 2. Some factors influencing technology alliance performance 
Category Success  factors 
Partner choice  Similar basic knowledge base 
Similar organizational problem set 
Prior alliance experience and know-how 
Governance choice & 
Organizational design 
Equity alliances in the case of highly tacit knowledge  
Contract-based alliances in the case of highly dynamic knowledge 
Multiple joint tasks in the case of highly tacit knowledge 
Multiple organizational interfaces in the case of highly tacit 
knowledge  
Experienced personnel allocation in the case of highly complex 
knowledge 
Process management  Development of relational capital 
  14Application of integrative conflict management 
Moreover, we have limited this overview to determinants which have been empirically 
tested. This means that there still remains a lot to be investigated and discovered. In the last 
section we will shortly discuss some interesting research gaps.  
 
Research gaps and opportunities 
 
In the former paragraphs we have highlighted different aspects and issues of technology 
alliances. And, as we can see, many issues are still unsolved and theory is still fragmented or 
too simplistic. We have identified four different themes that need future research attention, 
namely: innovation performance of alliances versus other organizational forms, the 
governance choice, knowledge and learning at the individual level, and alliance evolution.  
 
Technology alliances versus internal development and market transactions  
Although firms use different motives to start collaboration with partners, and hence expect 
several advantages of collaboration which cannot be achieved individually, it is still unclear 
whether alliances are superior to other forms of organization with respect to innovation. For 
instance, recent research of Almeida et al. (2002) shows that multi-national corporations 
(MNC) outperform alliances and market transactions with respect to cross-border 
knowledge development. So, although alliances are a ‘hot topic’ in research and practice, we 
need to be critical about the true value and performance of alliances with respect to other 
forms of innovation and R&D. Complicating factor in comparing research results is that 
most studies use different performance measures and focus on different processes. As a 
consequence of this, a definite answer or integrated overview of the pros and cons of 
internal or external development of technology cannot yet be given. Hence, comparison of 
organizational forms and innovation performance (and organizational performance in 




As we have seen, many researchers have studied the influence of governance structure on 
alliance performance. However, still no complete and integrated picture has emerged. 
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technology and knowledge attributes. Moreover, in most research gross simplifications of 
the many different forms of governance are made (e.g. equity vs. non-equity). This does not 
do justice to the many types of partnerships and organizational modes of cooperation which 
can be found in reality (cf. Hagedoorn, 1993). Hence, it is worthwhile to unpack the issues of 
governance and its interactions with other relevant aspects of technology alliances such as 
learning, environmental turbulence, organizational design and process dynamics.  
 
Knowledge, technology and research levels 
Most of alliance research has studied alliance structure, processes and performance at firm-
level. There exists a lack of research at the individual and behavioral level of alliances. 
Attitudes, perceptions and actions of alliance managers and alliance team-members are 
relatively under-studied. We assume that managerial behavior in non-hierarchical work 
situations and across firm-boundaries is indeed different from that of behavior in 
hierarchical work relationships (Osborn & Hagedoorn, 1997). It seems worthwhile to study 
these aspects with respect to the dynamics of the alliance. Also with respect to inter-
organizational learning processes and knowledge processes it is important to study these at a 
more individual level. Learning and knowledge sharing occurs (firstly) at the individual level 
and is embedded in communication processes between organizational members. It seems 
plausible that managerial behavior and team members’ actions should have large implications 
for learning and knowledge sharing between people (cf. Hamel, 1991).  
 
Alliance evolution 
The last research opportunity we want to address here is alliance evolution. Longitudinal 
studies of alliances are limited in number and hence, our understanding of process dynamics 
and evolution of alliances is also limited. Only little research has focused on these process 
issues, of which the research of Doz (1996) is worth mentioning. The research on learning 
races (Hamel, 1991; Khanna et al., 1998) has shed some light on alliance dynamics. However, 
the models used to explain the occurrence of learning races are rather simplistic, and are 
based on narrow game-theoretical interpretations of firm behavior. The existence of learning 
races has not yet been empirically tested, and seems to exist primarily in the interpretations 
  16of academics (Inkpen, 2000). Longitudinal event studies of alliances could enhance our 
understanding of alliance dynamics greatly.  
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